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I examine whether firms alter their tax avoidance behavior in 
response to the introduction of takeover friendly M&A laws in an 
international setting. Using the tax avoidance measure suggested by 
Atwood et al. (2012), I find strong evidence that firms tend to bear 
more current taxes paid when takeover threat increases. Moreover, 
I find that the negative relationship between the introduction of 
takeover friendly M&A laws and tax avoidance is attenuated for firms 
which are cross-listed in the American stock exchange implying the 
effect of the information environment quality. In addition, tax 
avoidance behaviors are more pronounced in countries where 
managers enjoy higher equity-based compensation. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
Tax avoidance behavior on corporate reporting has been 
represented as a consequence of agency problem between 
shareholders and managers (Slemrod, 2004; Chen and Chu 2005; 
Crocker and Slemrod, 2005). Tax authorities also come into the 
picture claiming their share on firms’ performances as tax and 
conduct audits after tax reportings to investigate any misreporting 
intended to circumvent tax liabilities. Regarding the three main 
participants in the field, managers may engage in tax avoidance 
behaviors for the benefit of shareholders or of their own. 
Shareholders perceive such behaviors to be efficient which increase 
firm value or a type of managers’ entrenchments that should be 
controlled. Tax authorities may or may not be able to detect tax 
avoidance behaviors and conclude that such behaviors violated the 
law and impose penalties. Due to the complex intentions and 
relationships among the participants in regards to tax reporting, prior 
studies show mixed results on the determinants and consequences of 
tax avoidance.  
In this paper, I examine market for corporate control as a 
determinant of tax avoidance by investigating the reaction of firms 
on the introduction of takeover friendly M&A laws. The staggered 
 
２ 
initiation of M&A laws activates the market for corporate control 
which act as an exogenous shock providing an opportunity to observe 
the effect of external corporate governance mechanism. The 
consequences of the increased takeover threat should be analyzed in 
regards to the marginal benefits and costs of subsequent tax 
avoidance behaviors. Marginal benefits from altering tax reporting 
decisions will be maintaining managers positions as market for 
corporate control increases takeover threat and discipline managers 
because the possibility of dismissing managers become higher when 
ownership changes (Lel and Miller, 2015). Marginal costs will be 
potential reputational, political and monetary penalty costs in cases 
of tax audits. On one hand, shareholders perceive tax avoidance to 
be tax-efficient decisions and such behaviors to result in the 
increase of firm value. Therefore, managers will tend to increase tax 
avoidance behaviors for the benefit of shareholders despite the 
potential costs. On the other hand, shareholders think that managers 
engage in tax avoidance activities to divert corporate resources 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). From this perspective, increased 
takeover threat will guide managers to decrease tax avoidance and 
related entrenchment activities. Based on an international setting 
involving 22 countries, I find that firms decrease tax avoidance 
behaviors after the initiation of staggered takeover friendly M&A 
 
３ 
laws. The results support the view that managers engage in tax 
avoidance activities for their own benefit than that of the 
shareholders.  
Moreover, I show evidence on the role of information 
environment on the association between the market for corporate 
control and tax avoidance. When market for corporate control is 
activated than before, investors will gather private information for 
potential investment decision makings and the information 
environment will improve in consequence. By analyzing firms cross-
listed on the American stock exchange and the market of the 
countries in which the firms were incorporated, I observe that the 
effect of the initiation of M&A laws are attenuated among cross-
listed firms indicating that the effect is larger for firms that are not 
cross-listed. The results suggest that the managerial disciplinary 
role of M&A laws are performed by affecting the quality of 
information environments. Also, by comparing the subsample in 
regards to the level of equity-based compensation, I observe that 
managers with high percentage of equity-based compensation 
decrease tax avoidance behavior which is in align with linking tax 
avoidance behavior to firm value-decreasing activities.   
I believe that this paper has several contributions to the prior 
literature. First, this paper adds to the literature that investigates the 
 
４ 
determinants of tax avoidance behavior of firms which is a relatively 
new line of research that is to be explored (Hanon and Heitzman, 
2010). Especially, the paper adopts the principal-agent framework 
and supports the view managers extracting rents from tax avoidance 
behaviors (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Desai et al. 2007; Chen et 
al. 2010; Kim et al. 2011). Second, this paper contributes to the 
literature that examines the role of market for corporate control as 
an external corporate governance mechanism disciplining managers 
and reducing agency costs (Lel and Miller, 2005; Glendening et al., 
2016). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
reviews prior literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 
presents sample selection and research design. Section 4 reports the 









2.1. Tax avoidance 
 
Tax avoidance is broadly defined as the reduction of explicit 
taxes (Dyreng et al., 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). The term 
covers any transactions that lessens the firm’s explicit tax liabilities 
including tax-favored real activities, tax credits, targeted tax 
benefits from lobbying activities, and even tax noncompliance. Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010) suggests that tax avoidance and relevant tax 
planning strategies can be set on a spectrum in relation to its degree 
of aggressiveness. Regardless of the intention and consequences of 
the tax planning strategies, as long as the activities lower the taxes 
that the firms bear, such behaviors are perceived as tax avoidance 
behaviors.  
Prior literature on tax avoidance is founded on the principal-
agent framework between managers and shareholders. Separation of 
ownership and control results in efficiency loss in taxes and tax 
compliance penalties levied on managers or the shareholders (Chen, 
2005; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005). Viewing tax avoidance as an 
investment opportunity, managers weigh the marginal costs including 
 
６ 
political, reputational, and monetary penalty costs, and marginal 
benefits of cash savings and subsequent investments. The 
equilibrium of marginal benefits and costs from the managers’ 
perspective may not align with those of the shareholders, causing 
agency problems (Amstrong et al. 2015). Therefore, tax avoidance 
related decisions made by managers incorporate individual traits 
including managerial ability, overconfidence, and prior experiences 
(Dyreng et al., 2010; Koester et al., 2017; Chyz et al., 2019).  
Another stream of literature view tax avoidance as an act of self-
interested managers for the purpose of managerial opportunism 
including corporate resource diversion and earnings management 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Desai et al. 2007). Chen et al. (2010) 
finds that family firms engage in less tax avoidance activities to avoid 
stock price discounts from investors perceiving the activities as 
family entrenchment. Also, managers construct complex transactions 
for rent extraction and justify the opacity of tax avoidance 
transactions by claiming that complexity and obfuscation are 
necessary to minimize the risk of tax avoidance arrangements being 
detected by the tax authorities (Kim et al., 2011). In the context of 
viewing tax avoidance as value-destructive, Chow et al. (2016) 
provides evidence that target firms which disclosed non-tax 
sheltering activities are associated with higher takeover premiums. 
 
７ 
This indicates that potential investors including the acquirers value 
less tax avoidance behaviors.  
In order to mitigate the agency problem, papers investigate the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on tax avoidance which 
shows mixed evidence. Equity-based incentives show negative 
association with tax avoidance for poorly governed firms and on the 
extreme levels of tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; 
Amstrong et al., 2015). Geartner (2014) gives empirical evidence on 
the negative effect of after-tax CEO bonus incentives on effective 
tax rates. However, some papers pinpoint that equity risky incentives 
encourage risky tax planning strategies because such decisions 
increase stock return volatility and value of stock options (Atwood 
et al., 2012; Rego and Wilson, 2012). Other corporate governance 
mechanisms including board and ownership characteristics are also 
investigated to be determinants of tax avoidance. Amstrong et al. 
(2015) finds that board independence and financial sophistication 
leads to lower tax avoidance in high levels of tax avoidance, but 
higher tax avoidance in lower levels of tax avoidance. Khan et al. 
(2017) finds that institutional ownership is positively associated with 
greater tax avoidance behavior by managers who voluntarily engage 
in such behaviors to improve after-tax performance for the passive 
and diversified holdings. Chen et al. (2010) shows family firms are 
 
８ 
less tax aggressive than non-family counterparts in concern with 
potential reputational and penalty costs. 
 
2.2. Takeover activity as a corporate governance 
mechanism 
 
The initiation of takeover friendly M&A laws activates the 
market for corporate control, increase the threat of takeover, and 
promote asset reallocation on the market level. The market for 
corporate control alters managers’ behavior in two ways, resulting in 
mitigating or worsening the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. On one hand, managers try to derive private benefit 
and gain more control benefit by engaging in activities that destruct 
shareholders’ values which increases agency costs. These 
managerial decisions affect the board when directors make M&A 
decisions by including blocking potential value-enhancing mergers 
or pursing value-destroying mergers. (Wang and Wu, 2009).  
On the other hand, market for corporate control enhances 
managerial discipline and alleviates the agency problem between 
managers and shareholders. The threat of takeover increases the 
possibility of entrenched managers to be replaced in order to protect 
the firm from being acquired or to lose their jobs when the firm is 
actually acquired. Therefore, managers exert more effort by making 
 
９ 
decisions in align with shareholders’ interests to preserve their 
positions and reduce reputational costs, especially in poorly 
performing firms (Lel and Miller, 2015). Also, managers decide to 
reduce the likelihood of dividend payment and the amount of 
dividends because managers’ interest in using dividends as a mean 
to show commitment to shareholders decreases considering other 
managerial performances which align manager-shareholders’ 
interests (Glendening et al., 2016). Khurana and Wang (2019) 
examines the disciplinary effect on accounting conservatism. The 
paper provides empirical evidence that the degree of accounting 
conservatism significantly increases after the introduction of M&A 
laws due to decisions of managers to increase financial leverage and 
decrease capital investment to protect the firm from unwanted 
takeover attempts and motivating board’s monitoring activities who 
requires conservative reporting behavior at the firm level. Looking 
from an opposite view, the introduction of anti-takeover legislation 
in France had a negative effect on shareholder value and increased 
management entrenchment was found at affected firms (Frattaroli, 
2020). This indicates that increased possibility of takeover activity 
disciplines management behaviors in align with shareholders’ 
interests. 




Based on prior literature on tax avoidance and initiation of 
takeover friendly laws, I hypothesize that managers alter corporate 
tax decisions in response to the introduction of M&A laws. In one 
case, managers may increase tax avoidance behavior in order to 
secure their positions. Due to the increased possibility of CEO 
turnovers from market of corporate control, managers may decrease 
current tax payment to produce better performance results in the 
short term (Lel and Miller, 2015). For well governed firms, active 
tax shelter firms exhibit positive abnormal returns indicating 
shareholder wealth improvement (Wilson, 2009). Moreover, 
managers may increase tax avoidance behaviors and engage in 
entrenching activities to gain more control benefit showing the “dark 
side” of managerial control benefits in regards to the higher 
possibility of takeovers and subsequent replacements (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006; Wang and Wu, 2019).  
Managers may decrease the level of tax avoidance due to the 
managerial disciplinary role of the market of corporate control and 
the change in information environment. From the perspective that 
managers engage in tax avoidance behaviors in order to divert 
corporate resources, managers may construct transactions which 
leads to complex structure of firms to facilitate such behaviors (Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2006; Desai et al. 2007). Also, tax avoidance 
 
１１ 
facilitates bad news hoarding activities for extended periods by 
providing justifications for opportunistic behaviors which leads to 
stock price crashes damaging the information environment (Kim et al. 
2011). In such situations, the initiation of M&A laws improves the 
information environment and enable better monitoring and discipline 
by potential investors (Glendening et al. 2016). External market of 
corporate control promotes private information gathering and 
subsequent trading on such information which leads to more opened 
stock markets with higher stock price informativeness (Ferreira and 
Laux, 2007). Therefore, managers may decrease complex 
transactions in purpose of tax avoidance and entrenchment after the 
initiation of takeover friendly acts. In addition, the market for control 
induces managers with control benefit to exert greater effort in value 
enhancing activities and decrease entrenchment, the “bright side” of 
managerial control benefits, to lower the possibility of possible 
takeovers and management replacement by the board (Lel and Miller, 
2015; Wang and Wu, 2009).  
 Based on the contrasting views on the effect of external 
market for control on tax avoidance, I state hypothesis H1 in null 
form as the following: 
 
H1: The staggered initiation of M&A laws is not associated with 
 
１２ 
tax avoidance behavior of firms. 
 
 




3.1. Empirical model 
 
To test the hypothesis, I investigate the impact of M&A law 
adoptions on tax avoidance by conducting a difference-in-
differences (DiD) analysis. Based on Lel and Miller (2015), M&A 
laws act as an exogenous shock leading to increased threat of 
takeover which may alter managers’ interests and relevant behaviors 
concerning the alignment with shareholders’ interests. The empirical 
model compares the tax avoidance level of firms located in countries 
where M&A laws have been enacted during the sample period 
(TREAT=1) with firms which do not experience such shock 
(TREAT=0). The following is the estimation model based on Atwood 






3.2. Tax avoidance measure 
 
Based on the measure suggested by Atwood et al. (2012), the 




The measure computes the tax avoidance level of firms by 
evaluating the difference between the statutory tax amount on pre-
tax income (PTEBX ×τ) and the cash tax amount paid in the current 
period (CTP) as a ratio with pre-tax income as the denominator. If 
TaxAvoid is positive, it indicates that the firm explicitly paid less tax 
than the statutory tax rate (τ) showing tax avoidance behavior, and 
vice versa. In other words, the measure captures all explicit efforts 
of firms to avoid taxes including tax planning strategies, tax credits, 
and tax aggressive behaviors following the definition of tax avoidance 
suggested by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Atwood et al. (2010). 
Moreover, the measure is effective in the international setting 
because the statutory tax rate (τ) serves as the basis for the level of 
taxes paid more or less by firms located in countries with various 
level of tax rates across the sample period which enhances 
 
１４ 
comparability among firms. TaxAvoid is an annual measure to 
directly compare the effect of the before and after the introduction 
of takeover laws in the DiD model.① 
 
3.3. Control measures 
 
I control for firm-level and country-level variables which are 
associated with tax avoidance based on prior literature. Firm-level 
variables are included to control profitable firms’ incentives to avoid 
taxes (ROA), large firms facing high political and reputational costs 
in case of tax audits due to aggressive tax planning (SIZE), tax 
incentives or credits that firms may enjoy due to intensive intangible 
investment (INTANG), interest deductibility according to level of 
leverage (LEV), high marginal benefit from tax planning for high 
sales growth firms (GROWTH), and the probability of income shifting 
through foreign operations (MULTI).  
In regards to country-level variables, tax system measures, 
BTaxC, WW, and TaxEnf, control for tax system characteristics 
which differ among countries. BTaxC captures the required book-
tax conformity level of countries suggested by Atwood et al. 
 
① TaxAvoid may be exaggerated because the measure does not incorporate 
the reversed effect of tax adjustments on subsequent periods and tax 
strategies to avoid taxes (Dyreng et al. 2008). Robustness test using a three-
year window measure is conducted in Chapter 4.4 Additional analyses. 
 
１５ 
(2010).②   The variable measures the required flexibility that a 
country allows in reported taxable income from pre-tax book income. 
Following Atwood et al. (2012), WW and TaxEnf indicates whether 
a country adopted worldwide or territorial approach and the 
managers’ perceptions on tax evasion and its’ threat on economy, 
respectively.③  It is expected for firms in countries with tax systems 
that allow more discretion to exhibit greater tax avoidance behavior. 
Higher BTaxC indicating less required book-tax conformity, 
worldwide approach in tax systems (WW) leading to less benefit on 
worldwide tax planning opportunities, and higher TaxEnf showing 
managers’ perceptions on higher level of tax enforcement can be 
interpreted as lower discretion in the tax systems for firms to engage 
in tax avoidance behavior. Therefore, it is predicted that BTaxC, WW, 
and TaxEnf have a negative association with TaxAvoid. Statutory tax 
rate (TAXRATE) is also inserted in the model to control for cross-
country differences. A country’s average managers’ equity-based 
 
② Atwood et al. (2010) requires at least 40 country-year observations to 
calculate BTaxC. I relax the restriction to at least 20 country-year 
observations following Atwood et al. (2012). 
③ WW is handcollected from various sources including PwC’s “Evolution of 
Territorial Tax Systems in the OECD” report and Kanagaretnam et al. (2016). 
In case of TaxEnf, the data is obtained from IMD World Competitiveness 
Online database from 1997 to 2005 because I did not have access to 1996 
World Competitiveness Report as used in Atwood et al. (2012). Considering 
the sample period, 1991-2005, IMD World Competitiveness Report Online 
provides more relevant data in time series than 1996 World Competitiveness 
Report which only provides data for 1996. 
 
１６ 
compensation including options and restricted stocks as a percentage 
of total compensation (PCTEQ) is considered to control the effect of 
management equity incentives on tax avoidance. ④   Earnings 
volatility (EARNVOL) is controlled because cross-sectional 
variance in pre-tax earnings among countries is positively correlated 
with BTaxC. By including EARNVOL, the overstated effect of BTaxC 
on TaxAvoid can be mitigated. Law enforcement variable (LAWE) 
measures countries’ characteristics on regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption which is developed by Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) as a part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators project. 
The variable is designed to show investor protection which is 
stronger when the quality of law enforcement is higher.⑤ 
 
④ Whereas Atwood et al. (2012) utilizes variable portion of management 
compensation from Towers Perrin Worldwide Total Remuneration Report, 
2005-2006 (2005), I use the equity-based compensation data from Bryan et 
al. (2010) following Kanagaretnam et al. (2016) due to data constraint. Bryan 
et al. (2010) provides data for 43 countries covering more countries than 
Towers Perrin (2005) which only covers 22 countries. 
⑤ I use the mean value of regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption to construct LAWE from 1996 to 2005 for the sample period from 
1991 to 1995 because the data is collected from 1996. Prior literature mostly 
utilizes La porta et al.(1998) which provides law enforcement indicators 
mainly covering 1980-1995. I find that LAWE is more relevant in regards to 
the sample period. 
 
１７ 
Chapter 4. Empirical results 
 
 
4.1. Sample selection 
 
The sample consists of 33,130 firm-year observations from 22 
countries. Firm-level data are collected from the Legacy Compustat 
Global database.⑥  Based on the staggered initiation of takeover laws 
analyzed by Lel and Miller (2015), the sample period is from 1991 to 
2005, starting one year before the first enactment (1992, Italy) and 
ending one year after the last enactment (2004, Switzerland). 
Countries that passed takeover friendly M&A laws before the sample 
period are excluded from the sample. From the data set, I screen for 
missing individual data used for constructing variables. For R&D 
expenses and total dividends, I replace missing values with 0. In 
order to mitigate the effect of outliers, negative pre-tax earnings 
before exceptional items (PTEBX) are deleted and continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year at the 
firm-year level. Observations were dropped if firm-year 
 
⑥ Despite the fact that the new Global Compustat database contains more 
recent data, I use the Legacy Compustat Global database because the new 
database lacks financial data, pre-tax exceptional items (data item 57) and 
foreign income taxes (data item 51), which is used to construct the main 
dependent and control variable, TaxAvoid and BTaxC, respectively. 
 
１８ 
observations were less than 20 for each country.⑦   
Table 1 reports the sample distribution by country and year of 
the M&A law initiation. The sample is composed of 33,130 firm-year 
observations from 7,261 unique firms of 22 countries. Eleven 
countries have initiated takeover friendly M&A laws during the 
sample period. Among such countries, Germany has the greatest 
number of observations (2,882 observations), followed by 
Switzerland (1,280 observations), and India (938 observations). In 
case of countries that have not enacted M&A laws, Japan shows the 
largest observation by 18,363 observations. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of and correlations among 
the variables. Panel A and B depicts the statistics for the full sample 
and by country, respectively. In regards to the full sample, the mean 
(median) TaxAvoid is 0.036 (0.043) showing that average(median) 
 
⑦ Atwood et al. (2010) requires at least 40 country-year observations. I relax 
the restriction to at least 20 country-year observations following Atwood et 
al. (2012) for the purpose of sufficient treatment and control sample. The 
main result (untabulated) is statistically significant when restricting the 
sample to at least 40 country-year observations. 
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firms engage in tax avoidance behavior, paying 3.6% (4.3%) less tax 
in the current period compared to the statutory tax rate. 
Approximately 25.4% of the sample is classified as the treatment 
sample (TREAT=0.254) and 59.8% firm-year observations of the 
treatment sample (0.152/0.254) are observed on and after the year 
of initiation of the M&A laws. Analyzing by country, India shows the 
highest tax avoidance behavior (TaxAvoid=0.245) while Japan pay 
taxes in cash more than the statutory tax rate in the current period 
(TaxAvoid=-0.013) which is comparable to prior literature.  
Panel C presents Pearson correlations between the variables. 
Except the correlations in bold, all correlations between variables are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. To address 
the multicollinearity problem, I regress TaxAvoid on independent and 
control variables to calculate the variance inflation factors (VIF). All 
VIF is below the accepted threshold, 10, with 2.279 as its average 
value.⑧  Therefore, it can be said that the main results for our 
regressions hold statistical importance. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
⑧ TaxEnf shows the highest VIF value with 4.256. 
 
２０ 
4.3. Main result 
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the main regression 
model. The first and second column exhibits the result for the full 
sample and country-industry-year median sample, respectively. 
Both coefficients on POST*TREAT for column (1) and (2) are 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level (β1= -0.088 and -
0.061). This indicates that managers show lower tax avoidance 
behavior after takeover friendly M&A laws are initiated. The result 
supports the view on shareholders perceiving tax avoidance behavior 
of firms to be managers’ entrenchment activities and M&A laws 
acting as an external corporate governance mechanism to solve the 
existing agency problems between the managers and shareholders. 
Also, market for corporate control disciplines managers activities by 
making managers to exert greater effort in increasing firm value. In 
other words, when the market for corporate control becomes more 
active, shareholders emphasize the bright side of takeover threats in 
disciplining managers than the dark side in which managers engage 
in value-destructing activities for their benefit (Wang and Wu, 2019). 
Also, the coefficient on TREAT is positive and statistically significant 
at 1% level (β2= 0.070 and 0.057) which shows the different tax 
avoidance behavior of firms between the control (TREAT=0) and 
treatment group (TREAT=1).   
 
２１ 
Most of the control variables show consistent results with prior 
literature. In case of the full sample, coefficients on firm-level 
controls, profitability (ROA) and sales growth (GROWTH), are 
positive and statistically significant as predicted. Following Atwood 
et al. (2012), higher flexibility on book-tax conformity (BTaxC), 
worldwide approach in tax system (WW), stronger perception of tax 
enforcement by managers (TaxEnf), and higher earnings volatility 
(EARNVOL) are associated with lower tax avoidance. However, the 
results show contradictory results on countries’ legal tradition 
(COMMONLAW) and law enforcement (LAWE) compared to prior 
papers. The country-industry-year median sample follows the 
result of previous papers on the effect of sales growth (GROWTH), 
book-tax conformity (BTaxC), worldwide approach in tax system 
(WW), perceptions on tax enforcement (TaxEnF), statutory tax rate 
(TAXRATE), percentage of equity-based compensation (PCTEQ), 
and earnings volatility (EARNVOL). Similar to the full sample, the 
country-industry-year median sample also shows different results 
for COMMONLAW.⑨ 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
⑨  If LAWE is substituted to mean score of legal enforcement variables 
reported in La Porta et al. (1998), following prior literature including 
Kanagaetnam et al. (2016), the coefficient on LAWE is negative as predicted 




4.4. Additional analyses 
 
Information environment 
I further investigate the relationship between market for 
corporate control and tax avoidance in regards to firm-level 
information environment. As suggested in the hypothesis 
development, information environment may act as a channel for 
change in tax avoidance behavior. In an opaque information 
environment, managers may easily engage in complex transactions 
to divert resources and the impact of increased takeover threat may 
induce external investors to gather more private information than 
those in a better information environment with quality information 
(Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Kim et al. 2011; Glendening et al. 2016). 
In other words, market of corporate control will have less impact on 
investors and firms in transparent information environments. I insert 
an indicator variable (CROSSLIST) in the main regression model 
which shows whether the firm is cross-listed in the United States of 
America as well as the country it is incorporated. To ensure the level 
of transparency of the information environment and managers’ 
perceptions in regards to tax enforcement, I examine firms which are 
located in countries where tax enforcement, TaxEnf, is lower than 
that of the United States of America. This indicates that managers of 
 
２３ 
sample firms think that tax evasion is not a threat to the country in 
which the firms are located compared to the United States of America. 
Therefore, it can be predicted that managers of uncross-listed firms 
will engage in more tax avoidance behavior than cross listed firms 
before the initiation of M&A laws and the level of tax avoidance 
behaviors will decrease more as a consequence. The results in Table 
4 exhibit that the coefficient on POST*TREAT*CROSSLIST is 
positive and statistically significant (0.038) indicating that the effect 
of the initiation of M&A laws is attenuated for cross-listed firms. 
Moreover, the coefficient on TREAT*CROSSLIST is negative and 
statistically significant (-0.042), whereas the coefficient on 
CROSSLIST is not statistically significant, implying that cross-listed 
firms in the treatment group show less tax avoidance behavior than 
the control group.   
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Equity-based compensation 
Equity-based compensation has been utilized to incentivize 
managers to align their interests with shareholders. If shareholders 
perceive tax avoidance behavior as value-increasing, equity-based 
compensation promotes tax avoidance behavior. On the contrary, the 
 
２４ 
same compensation scheme will result in lower level of such behavior 
if shareholders support the opposite view on tax avoidance (Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010). Prior literature shows mixed evidence on 
whether such compensation scheme increased or decreased tax 
avoidance behavior of managers (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; 
Atwood et al., 2012; Rego and Wilson, 2012; Amstrong et al., 2015). 
Table 5 presents the association between tax avoidance and the 
market of corporate control in regards to the percentage of equity-
based compensation on total compensation (PCTEQ). To better 
observe the association, I exclude the control group and divide the 
sample according to the median of PCTEQ.⑩  The coefficient on the 
variable of interest, POST, is pronounced in column (2) with the value 
being negative and statistically significant. The table follows the 
result of the main regression model which supports the view on tax 
avoidance as value-decreasing management entrenchment. As high 
equity-based compensation links managers’ interests to align with 
shareholders’ wealth, the introduction of takeover friendly M&A laws 
incentivizes managers to reduce tax avoidance and entrenchment. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
⑩ The results (untabulated) are similar when the full sample is divided into 
quartile groups since the middle groups, the second and third group, are all 




4.5. Robustness check 
 
Alternative measures of tax avoidance 
 The main analysis utilizes the one-year tax avoidance 
measure to compare the results before and after the initiation without 
the effect of other year’s tax payments. Because of the concern that 
one-year measure TaxAvoid may not capture the reversibility of tax 
adjustments including deferred accounts and thus being exaggerated, 
I also test the robustness of the results using three-year average 
tax avoidance measure to attenuate the effect of short-term tax 
avoidance behavior which can be reversed in the subsequent periods. 
Also, I compute country-industry mean-adjusted measure of 
TaxAvoid to reflect the cross-country and industrial effects 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2016). Both regressions using alternative tax 
avoidance measures show consistent results with the main 
regression. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Excluding significant observations 
 Observations from Japan consist the most observations in the 
full sample and the control group, respectively. To eliminate the 
possible influence on the main result, I regress the main model 
excluding firms incorporated in Japan. The main result (untabulated) 
with both the full sample and country-industry-year median show 
 
２６ 
significant results.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the tax avoidance behavior of firms on the 
introduction of takeover friendly M&A laws. Using the tax avoidance 
measure developed by Atwood et al. (2012) and initiation of M&A 
laws analyzed by Lel and Miller (2005), I find that firms reduce tax 
payments in response to the exogenous effect of the active market 
of corporate control observed through the DiD model. The results 
support the view on managers engaging in tax avoidance behaviors in 
order to divert corporate resources. To investigate how the active 
market of corporate control affects managers’ behaviors, I examine 
the information environments of firms by incorporating whether the 
firms are cross-listed in the United States of America into the model. 
I observe that the results show that cross-listed firms tend to 
decrease their tax avoidance behavior less compared to those who 
are not cross-listed. Moreover, consistent with the prediction, the 
effect of the increased possibility of takeover threats are more 
pronounced for managers with higher equity-based compensation 
reducing tax avoidance behavior.  
 
２７ 
 This paper has several limitations. First, the measure for tax 
avoidance, TaxAvoid, mainly reflects non-conforming tax avoidance 
behaviors regardless of its intention. Therefore, this study lacks 
capturing the effect of the initiation of M&A laws on conforming tax 
avoidance. Also, the measure does not distinguish between legal tax 
avoidance behaviors and illegal or ambiguous tax aggressive 
behaviors. Second, potential endogeneity problems may arise from 
the fact that unobserved factors can influence the tax avoidance 
behavior of firms. Moreover, there are possibilities in which 
measurement errors may exist for variables that capture cross-
sectional differences among countries. Lastly, data constraints exist 
for worldwide data. 
In conclusion, this paper’s findings have an implication in 
observing the responses of firms on intensified external corporate 
governance mechanisms. This study adds support to the perspective 
that emphasizes the “bright side” of market of corporate control in 
order to mitigate agency problems by reducing tax avoidance 
behavior. Further research may be conducted on other channels on 
the association of market for corporate control and tax avoidance 
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M&A law year 
Austria 380 87 1998 
Brazil 540 131 - 
Chile 384 93 2000 
Denmark 802 144 - 
France 3,195 616 - 
Germany 2,882 573 2002 
Greece 248 79 - 
India 938 246 1997 
Indonesia 655 181 1998 
Ireland 212 45 1997 
Israel 22 22 - 
Italy 765 206 1992 
Japan 18,363 3,416 - 
Korea 482 206 - 
Mexico 404 81 - 
Norway 539 126 - 
New Zealand 238 74 2001 
Philippines 50 50 1998 
Portugal 49 34 - 
Switzerland 1,280 203 2004 
Taiwan 633 618 2002 
Turkey 69 30 - 






Table 2. Descriptive statistics 




Minimum Median Maximum 
TaxAvoid 0.036 0.221 -0.589 0.043 0.519 
POST 
*TREAT 
0.152 0.359 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TREAT 0.254 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 0.077 0.070 0.003 0.056 0.464 
SIZE 5.600 1.692 1.697 5.431 10.560 
INTANG 0.010 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.153 
LEV 0.104 0.104 0.000 0.075 0.513 
GROWTH 0.079 0.212 -0.625 0.048 2.102 
MULTI 0.028 0.165 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BTaxC 0.593 0.255 0.000 0.636 1.000 
WW 0.765 0.424 0.000 1.000 1.000 
TaxEnf 5.330 1.141 1.818 5.897 7.509 
TAXRATE 0.398 0.077 0.125 0.409 0.582 
PCTEQ 0.043 0.052 0.000 0.024 0.423 
EARNVOL 0.607 0.289 0.000 0.563 1.000 
COMMON
LAW 
0.043 0.202 0.000 0.000 1.000 






Table 2. Descriptive statistics 




TREAT ROA SIZE INTANG LEV GROWTH 
Austria 0.108 1.000 1.000 0.055 5.565 0.000 0.098 0.058 
Brazil 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.096 6.409 0.000 0.082 0.070 
Chile 0.041 1.000 1.000 0.078 5.016 0.000 0.057 0.086 
Denmark 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.073 5.177 0.000 0.077 0.070 
France 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.072 5.375 0.000 0.068 0.073 
Germany 0.140 0.000 1.000 0.071 5.567 0.000 0.056 0.056 
Greece 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.078 5.510 0.000 0.094 0.109 
India 0.245 1.000 1.000 0.113 4.942 0.000 0.031 0.071 
Indonesia 0.062 1.000 1.000 0.107 3.922 0.000 0.084 0.095 
Ireland 0.117 1.000 1.000 0.093 5.388 0.000 0.052 0.123 
Israel 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.079 6.249 0.011 0.066 0.076 
Italy 0.045 1.000 1.000 0.069 6.047 0.000 0.089 0.061 
Japan -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.043 5.408 0.001 0.090 0.022 
Korea 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.075 6.250 0.005 0.101 0.113 
Mexico 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.110 6.925 0.000 0.039 0.082 
Norway 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.082 5.195 0.000 0.027 0.100 
New Zealand 0.057 1.000 1.000 0.110 4.564 0.000 0.018 0.103 
Philippines 0.103 1.000 1.000 0.081 4.422 0.000 0.072 0.128 
Portugal 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.049 5.950 0.000 0.090 0.075 
Switzerland 0.084 0.000 1.000 0.065 5.822 0.000 0.048 0.055 
Taiwan 0.084 1.000 1.000 0.094 4.267 0.011 0.090 0.179 
Turkey 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.131 6.329 0.000 0.046 0.166 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel B: Median characteristics by country (continued) 




Austria 0.000 0.857 0.000 5.733 0.340 0.000 1.000 0.000 94.749 
Brazil 0.000 0.278 1.000 2.958 0.340 0.023 0.500 0.000 54.751 
Chile 0.000 1.000 1.000 7.029 0.165 0.000 0.588 0.000 89.606 
Denmark 0.000 0.500 0.000 5.976 0.320 0.109 0.471 0.000 98.533 
France 0.000 0.600 0.000 5.253 0.354 0.138 0.563 0.000 86.654 
Germany 0.000 0.100 1.000 4.658 0.516 0.046 0.188 0.000 92.857 
Greece 0.000 0.625 1.000 2.875 0.350 0.000 0.167 0.000 75.515 
India 0.000 0.063 1.000 2.500 0.441 0.000 0.267 1.000 47.675 
Indonesia 0.000 0.444 1.000 3.000 0.300 0.142 0.125 0.000 23.792 
Ireland 1.000 0.545 1.000 4.971 0.320 0.109 0.833 1.000 93.284 
Israel 0.000 0.176 1.000 4.611 0.350 0.160 0.882 1.000 78.287 
Italy 0.000 0.375 0.000 2.951 0.383 0.052 0.882 0.000 75.179 
Japan 0.000 0.688 1.000 5.897 0.409 0.024 0.867 0.000 82.227 
Korea 0.000 0.667 1.000 4.225 0.297 0.000 0.625 0.000 74.820 
Mexico 0.000 0.200 1.000 2.330 0.340 0.001 0.636 0.000 50.126 
Norway 0.000 0.182 1.000 5.671 0.280 0.000 0.438 0.000 95.442 
New Zealand 0.000 0.647 1.000 7.263 0.330 0.423 0.250 1.000 97.313 
Philippines 0.000 0.500 1.000 2.727 0.320 0.000 0.111 0.000 40.943 
Portugal 0.000 0.929 0.000 2.915 0.374 0.002 0.714 0.000 86.692 
Switzerland 0.000 0.750 0.000 6.837 0.249 0.040 0.600 0.000 97.083 
Taiwan 0.000 0.611 1.000 4.951 0.250 0.000 0.389 0.000 77.961 
Turkey 0.000 0.222 1.000 2.813 0.300 0.000 0.611 0.000 55.850 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel C: Pearson correlation 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 TaxAvoid 1        
2 POST*TREAT 0.101 1       
3 TREAT 0.177 0.726 1      
4 ROA 0.126 0.182 0.184 1     
5 SIZE -0.010 -0.107 -0.049 -0.184 1    
6 INTANG 0.001 -0.033 -0.016 0.096 0.071 1   
7 LEV 0.027 -0.073 -0.099 -0.302 0.045 -0.074 1  
8 GROWTH 0.139 0.101 0.093 0.299 -0.012 0.064 -0.036 1 
9 MULTI 0.030 0.101 0.128 0.058 0.108 0.096 -0.062 0.032 
10 BTaxC -0.186 -0.249 -0.428 -0.240 0.041 0.040 0.109 -0.065 
11 WW -0.078 -0.197 -0.266 -0.087 -0.023 0.005 0.093 -0.058 
12 TaxEnf -0.154 -0.440 -0.335 -0.227 0.002 0.099 0.064 -0.062 
13 TAXRATE 0.015 -0.321 -0.194 -0.176 0.116 -0.025 0.099 -0.120 
14 PCTEQ 0.072 0.071 0.105 0.115 -0.054 -0.054 -0.059 0.050 
15 EARNVOL -0.167 -0.302 -0.461 -0.251 0.089 -0.010 0.107 -0.128 
16 COMMONLAW 0.147 0.434 0.354 0.157 -0.064 -0.050 -0.089 0.043 





Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel C: Pearson correlation (continued) 
 Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 TaxAvoid          
2 POST*TREAT          
3 TREAT          
4 ROA          
5 SIZE          
6 INTANG          
7 LEV          
8 GROWTH          
9 MULTI 1         
10 BTaxC -0.119 1        
11 WW -0.127 0.137 1       
12 TaxEnf -0.041 0.561 0.048 1      
13 TAXRATE -0.106 -0.058 0.366 0.009 1     
14 PCTEQ 0.070 -0.132 -0.466 0.019 -0.170 1    
15 EARNVOL -0.074 0.647 0.177 0.357 0.228 -0.186 1   
16 COMMONLAW 0.105 -0.258 0.117 -0.309 0.002 0.192 -0.198 1  
17 LAWE 0.117 0.206 -0.337 0.635 0.044 0.087 0.126 -0.304 1 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of the full sample (Panel A and C), by country (Panel B). All reported correlations in Panel C are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better with the exception of the correlations in bold. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.
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Table 3. Tax avoidance behavior and the enactment of M&A laws 
TABLE 3 
Tax avoidance behavior and the enactment of M&A laws 
 
(1) Full sample  (2) Country-industry-
year median sample 
Variables Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 0.079 3.59***  0.035 1.32 
POST*TREAT -0.088 -12.66***  -0.061 -7.97*** 
TREAT 0.070 11.05***  0.057 9.29*** 
ROA 0.218 9.48***  0.093 2.20** 
SIZE -0.002 -1.64  0.001 0.55 
INTANG 0.009 0.12  0.062 0.43 
LEV 0.175 10.98***  0.001 0.02 
GROWTH 0.110 16.86***  0.061 4.37*** 
MULTI -0.006 -0.77  0.013 1.51 
BTaxC -0.034 -4.04***  -0.029 -2.90*** 
WW -0.040 -7.20***  -0.024 -4.32*** 
TaxEnf -0.016 -6.97***  -0.006 -1.78* 
TAXRATE 0.160 5.68***  0.234 7.47*** 
PCTEQ 0.001 0.02  -0.152 -4.48*** 
EARNVOL -0.028 -4.58***  -0.023 -2.71*** 
COMMONLAW 0.144 16.54***  0.124 12.92*** 
LAWE 0.000 1.83*  0.000 0.32 
      
N 33,130   4,701  
Adj. R-square 11.28%   13.91%  
Industry, year  
fixed effects 
Yes   Yes  
Cluster by firm Yes     
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. This table reports the result for the regression between the initiation 




Table 4. Tax avoidance behavior and the information environment 
TABLE 4 
Tax avoidance behavior and the information environment 
Variables Coefficient  t-stat 
Intercept 0.055  2.65*** 
POST*TREAT -0.096  -12.72*** 
POST*TREAT 
*CROSSLIST 
0.038  1.70* 
TREAT*CROSSLIST -0.042  -1.86* 
TREAT 0.084  12.76*** 
CROSSLIST -0.002  -0.17 
ROA 0.211  8.31*** 
SIZE -0.001  -0.64 
INTANG 0.165  2.17** 
LEV 0.172  10.09*** 
GROWTH 0.113  17.33*** 
MULTI 0.002  0.2 
BTaxC -0.022  -2.61*** 
WW -0.040  -5.85*** 
TaxEnf 0.219  -6.17*** 
TAXRATE -0.014  8.91*** 
PCTEQ -0.021  -0.37 
EARNVOL -0.046  -7.48*** 
COMMONLAW 0.132  14.98*** 
LAWE -0.000  -0.95 
    
N 28,504   
Adj. R-square 9.60%   
Industry, year  
fixed effects 
Yes   
Cluster by firm Yes   
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. This table reports the result for the regression between the initiation 
of M&A laws and tax avoidance in regards to information environment. All variables 




Table 5. Tax avoidance behavior by subsample: Equity-based 
compensation 
TABLE 5 
Tax avoidance behavior by subsample:  
Equity-based compensation 
 (1) Low PCTEQ  (2) High PCTEQ 
Variables Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept -0.430 -3.71***  -0.038 -0.68 
POST -0.024 -1.00  -0.035 -2.36*** 
ROA 0.188 2.51***  0.176 3.47*** 
SIZE 0.002 0.44  0.004 1.52 
INTANG 0.075 0.47  0.046 0.30 
LEV -0.021 -0.38  0.012 0.31 
GROWTH -0.001 -0.85  0.062 4.73*** 
MULTI -0.001 -0.07  -0.008 -0.63 
BTaxC 0.075 1.78***  -0.088 -3.60*** 
WW 0.074 3.30***  0.053 2.51*** 
TaxEnf 0.006 0.41  -0.026 -2.15*** 
TAXRATE 0.879 4.77***  0.613 4.72*** 
EARNVOL 0.046 1.71***  -0.025 -1.34 
COMMONLAW 0.114 3.57***  0.137 3.54*** 
LAWE 0.001 0.78  0.001 1.20 
      
N 3,665   4,752  
Adj. R-square 3.85%   14.67%  
Industry, year  
fixed effects 
Yes   Yes  
Cluster by firm Yes   Yes  
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. This table reports the result for the regression between the initiation 
of M&A laws and tax avoidance of subsamples in regards to the level of PCTEQ. All 




Table 6. Robustness check: alternative tax avoidance measures 
TABLE 6 
Robustness check: alternative tax avoidance measures 
 




year adjusted measure 
Variables Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 0.220 6.10***  0.251 11.41*** 
POST*TREAT -0.069 -6.48***  -0.088 -12.66*** 
TREAT 0.081 9.11***  0.070 11.05*** 
ROA 0.134 3.45***  0.218 9.48*** 
SIZE -0.005 -2.88***  -0.002 -1.64 
INTANG 0.244 1.65*  0.009 0.12 
LEV 0.302 8.95***  0.175 10.98*** 
GROWTH 0.070 5.62***  0.110 16.86*** 
MULTI -0.022 -1.39  -0.006 -0.77 
BTaxC -0.041 -3.51***  -0.034 -4.04*** 
WW -0.007 -0.93  -0.040 -7.20*** 
TaxEnf -0.046 -11.71***  -0.016 -6.97*** 
TAXRATE -0.181 -4.42***  0.160 5.68*** 
PCTEQ -0.030 -0.58  0.001 0.02 
EARNVOL -0.034 -3.15***  -0.028 -4.58*** 
COMMONLAW 0.140 10.95***  0.144 16.54*** 
LAWE 0.002 7.06***  0.000 1.83* 
      
N 33,130   33,130  
Adj. R-square 4.06%   32.79%  
Industry, year  
fixed effects 
Yes   Yes  
Cluster by firm Yes   Yes  
***, **, * Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. This table reports the result for the regression between the initiation 
of M&A laws and tax avoidance. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
TaxAvoid A measure of tax avoidance of a year which is 
calculated in reference to Atwood et al. (2012), 




PTEBX = pre-tax earnings before exceptional 
items  
(Item 21 – Item 57) 
𝜏 = statutory corporate income tax rate 
CTP = current tax paid  
(Item 24 – the change in Item 100) 
Higher TaxAvoid indicates higher tax avoidance 




Three-year average of TaxAvoid calculated by 
following Atwood et al. (2012), 









Higher TaxAvoid indicates higher tax avoidance 
behavior, paying less current tax paid in cash. 
Adj_TaxAvoid Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2016),   
Adj_TaxAvoid is calculated as subtracting the 
country-industry-year median TaxAvoid from 
firm-level TaxAvoid. 
Independent variable 
POST An indicator variable that equals 1 if the year is on 
or after the year of M&A law enactment; 0 
otherwise. 
TREAT An indicator variable that equals 1 for firms located 
in countries that initiated M&A law during the 





CROSSLIST An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
cross-listed on American stock exchanges; 0 
otherwise.  
Control variables 
BTaxC A measure of the level of required book-tax 
conformity following Atwood et al. (2010) which 
reflects managers’  incentives to report higher 
earnings while minimizing taxes paid. Higher 
BTaxC indicates higher required book-tax 
conformity. 
WW An indicator variable that equals 1 if the country 
adopted a worldwide tax system; 0 if the country 
adopted a territorial tax system. 
TaxEnf A measure of tax enforcement by measuring 
managers’ perceptions on tax evasion and its’ 
threat on economy. Constructed by calculating the 
mean value of TaxEnf from 1997 to 2005. Data 
obtained by IMD World Competitiveness Online 
(https://worldcompetitiveness.imd.org/). Higher 
TaxEnf indicates higher tax enforcement perceived 
by managers. 
ROA Pre-tax return on assets measured as pre-tax 
income before exceptional items (Item 21 – Item 
57) scaled by lagged total assets (Item 89) 
SIZE Natural log of total assets (Item 89) 
INTANG Research and development expense (Item 52) 
scaled by lagged total assets (Item 89). Set 
research and development expense to 0 when the 
value is missing.  
 
LEV Total long-term liabilities (Item 108 + Item 94) 
scaled by total assets (Item 89) 




MULTI An indicator variable that equals 0 when foreign 
income taxes (Item 51) is 0 or missing; 1 otherwise 
TAXRATE Statutory tax rate collected from various sources 
including Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Corporate 
Tax Guide, KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax 
Rate Survey, OECD Tax Database, and PwC’s 
Worldwide Tax summaries 
PCTEQ Sum of the Black and Scholes (1973) option value 
compensation and restricted stock compensation 
divided by total compensation collected from Bryan 
et al. (2010) 
EARNVOL Scaled descending decile rank of cross-sectional 
pre-tax earnings volatility by country-year 
following Atwood et al. (2010) 
COMMONLAW An indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’
s legal tradition is common law; 0 if the country’s 
legal tradition is code law 
LAWE Mean value of the percentile rank among all 
countries on regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control for corruption, developed by Kaufmann et 
al. (2010) from 1996 to 2005. LAWE ranges from 






본 연구는 기업간 인수합병을 촉진하는 법률의 도입이 기업의 
조세회피성향에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 1991년부터 2005년까지 22
개 나라의 상장 기업을 대상으로 Atwood et al. (2012)의 조세회피 측
정치를 이용하여 가설을 검증하였다. 검증 결과, 인수합병을 용이하게 
하는 법률이 도입되면 기업은 조세회피성향을 줄이는 것으로 나타났다. 
이러한 결과는 기업이 미국에도 교차 상장된 경우에 정보 환경의 수준이 
교차 상장되지 않은 기업보다 높기 때문에 약하게 나타나는 것으로 나타
났다. 또한, 선행 연구에 따라 기업간 인수합병을 촉진하는 법률이 도입
되었을 때 경영자의 주식기준 보상 수준이 높을수록 조세회피성향이 높
아지는 것으로 나타났다.  
